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The design and implementation of a systems approach to a scalable, standardized 
automated cyber penetration testing system using the Detect, Identify, Predict, React 
(DIPR) intelligence automation model and data interoperability standards is the focus of 
this thesis.  The system fuses information from multiple freeware programs that can be 
thought of as cyber sensors into an interoperable, robust whole in a manner that can tailor 
itself and learn over time.  The groundwork is laid for an enduring system that can adapt 
to changing systems and vulnerabilities.  A barebones proof-of-concept system is 
implemented and  tested using NMap and Ettercap with the proposed DIPR XML file 
formats as the data intelligence automation standardization mechanism.  By 
implementing this automated cyber penetration system, labor-intensive and costly cyber 
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As industry becomes more reliant on complex computer systems using well-known 
protocols, it becomes increasingly important to ensure vulnerabilities are caught and 
corrected early [1].  A method of addressing this need is to focus on the automation of 
penetration testing in order to reduce time and manpower required to test well-known 
vulnerabilities.  The impact of rising levels of complexity of software and networks 
creates a dynamic environment requiring additional time and effort to adequately adapt 
tools and techniques [1].  
One approach to detecting vulnerabilities is cyber penetration testing. This task is 
most beneficial to increasing cyber security; however, there is a high cost of time, money, 
and manpower associated with manual cyber penetration [1].   
With increased computing power available, intelligent automation is a clear 
choice for simplifying the lives of both administrators and developers.  Actual 
implementation, however, is harder when the long-term scalability and evolution of both 
vulnerabilities and exploits must be taken into account.  Data needed to pass information 
between automated systems needs to be standardized into an interoperable data schema.  
In order to scale, standardize, and automate intelligence, a system of systems 
methodology to automating cyber penetration testing is needed. This is the high-level 
goal and problem statement for this thesis. 
To achieve the high-level goal of automating cyber penetration testing, there are 
three objectives for this thesis: (1) use a systems approach to design an architecture that 
automates the tasks of a cyber-penetration operator, (2) design an interoperable data 
format to interpret the automation systems, and (3) implement a proof-of-concept system 
of the modeling/design objectives (1) and (2). 
A unique systems solution to the high-level goal of automating cyber 
vulnerability evaluation and penetration of a target network is presented in this thesis.  In 
order to achieve the first objective of systems architecture design for automating a cyber-
penetration system, the Detect, Identify, Predict, React (DIPR) intelligence automation 
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model is utilized.  In previous work the DIPR framework has been applied to cyber for 
determining defensive cyber-attacks, where the detect modules attempt to dynamically 
detect cyber red team activity [2]–[5].  In [2], the dynamic defensive cyber sensors were 
Intrusion Detection Systems, and the research focused on the optimal configuration of 
such systems in order to detect and identify states indicative of red team activity.  In 
contrast to [2], the DIPR framework is used in this thesis to detect network activity using 
freeware programs as cyber sensors that are needed in order to sense the vulnerability of 
a network device in the cyber terrain.  This systems approach yields a long term solution 
to automating cyber penetration with the ability for the system to scale by selecting “plug 
and play” cyber penetration tools. It is a system that maximizes the processing the 
computer performs to automatically analyze targets, properly identify vulnerabilities, and, 
finally, perform automated cyber penetration attacks. 
The foundation for creating a scalable and implementable automated system that 
maximizes individual components is to have a clear architecture planned beforehand.  By 
endeavoring to enable any new program to fit and feed into this system, a flexible and 
long-lasting tool is produced that can adapt as both vulnerabilities as well as the methods 
for exploiting those vulnerabilities change.   
The approach taken by this thesis is to first generate a system of systems 
architecture for automating cyber penetration testing, which includes both system design 
and design of the needed data interoperability standards for the data transmitted between 
each intelligence automation system.   
The external systems diagram (ESD) of the proposed cyber systems of systems 
approach for automating cyber penetration of a network connects directly into the 
targeted cyber network.  The external systems diagram of such a proposed solution is 
depicted in Figure 1.  The external systems are the human operator and the targeted 
network system needing cyber penetration, denoted as “Cyber Terrain.”  The operator in 
this case initially is deeply involved in developing exploits for specific vulnerabilities to 
tailor to the DIPR Automated Cyber Penetration System.  Subsequent to tool 
development, the operator is involved to a limited extent while the DIPR system is 
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executing, allowing the automated system to process and launch the desired exploit.  The 
operator may choose to validate the automated process and provide feedback. 
 
Figure 1. The DIPR automated cyber penetration system external system. 
Breaking the proposed system into a more detailed view, we can see the data flow 
between the modules as depicted in Figure 2.  The DIPR Automated Cyber Penetration 
System includes four intelligence automation modules that transform cyber data from 
data created when initially sensing the cyber terrain using freeware programs. Then the 
data is transformed into intelligence automation representations associated with four 
modules of intelligence automation: Detect, Identify, Predict, and React.  Besides the 
DIPR modules, there are the Graphical User Interface (GUI), network and exploit data 
structures.  The data flow begins with an interface between the DIPR system and the 
cyber terrain which captures the data using various freeware programs (Metasploit, 
NMap, Xprobe2, etc.).  In order for the solution to scale and adapt to the disparate nature 
of the outputs of the various freeware programs, a translation step must occur.  Thus, the 
proposed system’s functionality includes the ability to transform these outputs into 
useable, interoperable middleware formats.   
 xix 
 
Figure 2. The proposed DIPR automated cyber penetration system. 
The graphical user interface serves as the command and control (C2) structure for 
the system.  As each module performs its specific automated task, the GUI automatically 
allows the next module to begin.  This is also where the operator has the option to 
manually select and specify exactly which tasks to accomplish against the chosen target. 
For the sake of complexity management and storage reduction, only those features 
that are useful to exploits are retained. The Detect module creates a feature database per 
network entity, where a feature of a cyber-entity is considered a technical detail or piece 
of information about that host or network (open port, operating system, etc.) which later 
can be used to analyze that entity.  Detect features are represented and stored in data 
structures as part of the proposed DIPR Intelligence Automation Interoperability 
standards for data representation.  Similarly, the details required for each exploit are 
stored in their own data structure.  These data structures are maintained in a tree 
formatted extensible markup language (XML) document. 
Each of these features is then processed within the Identify module to determine 
vulnerabilities, where an intelligent state can be identified based on a group of specific 
features occurring simultaneously.  If vulnerabilities exist, then that host’s data structure 
 xx 
is updated accordingly.  Several fused features (i.e., intelligent states) occurring in a 
pattern within a period of time result in them being classified as a behavior in the predict 
module. 
After the state sequences are formed and vulnerability behaviors are classified, the 
predict module processes the inferred vulnerability behavior outcome by determining 
which exploits are available against the target.  Based on operator input and likelihood of 
success, a recommended cyber penetration attack is generated and added to the 
vulnerability data structure. 
When the inferred recommendation has been made, the react module uses all of 
the accumulated data to then launch the penetration attack most likely to succeed against 
the target computer. Upon completion, it determines if the attack was successful and 
feeds that information back into the exploit data structure to update the expected 
probability of success for that attack against that vulnerability.  
The DIPR intelligence automation interoperability standards are used to represent 
data generated by the DIPR modules.  Specific XML schemas which map to the DIPR 
modules in order to represent data between them are proposed in this thesis.  By 
implementing output/input of DIPR modules using XML files, the DIPR Automated 
Cyber Penetration system can scale with more freeware programs (cyber sensors) and 
more discovery/react tools.  
Following the generated architecture, we implement the architecture in a proof-of-
concept system, including both software implementations within a virtual network along 
with data interoperability standards implementation using proposed structured file 
formats.   
The final proof-of-concept network was set up using a simple client server 
configuration.  Using freeware together with the backbone architecture, a man-in-the-
middle (MiTM) attack was launched which poisoned the network and subsequently 
intercepted the data flowing between the client and the webserver.  For each success, the 
program updated the exploit database probability of success for that penetration attack 
exploiting that vulnerability.  The starting status for the penetration attack machine was a 
 xxi 
blind entrance onto the network with all target IP addresses unknown.  There was one 
server, one penetration attack box (running a basic version of the architecture proposed in 
this thesis), and a client which sent information back and forth across the network to a 
web server.  Overall success was determined by the positive integration of freeware 
programs for network discovery and attack as well as successful vulnerability analysis 
and attack prediction. 
Ultimately, this system does not remove the need for an experienced analyst 
evaluating vulnerabilities or methods of exploiting these vulnerabilities.  It helps provide 
a new long-lasting tool that will reduce the time needed to manually test and exploit a 
network.  As operating systems and network traffic change, so will the need for tools 
used to properly identify key vulnerabilities in an exploited system, underscoring the 
importance of being able to add new tools as fluidly and rapidly as possible to the system.  
This will benefit organizations in operational, tactical, strategic and acquisitions positions 
that have the need to determine, prioritize, and address network vulnerabilities of 
networks quickly and efficiently.   
 xxii 
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I. INTRODUCTION, OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND 
An overview of the problem statement, goals and an approach to solving the 
problem are presented in this thesis.  Following the overview is a breakdown of 
stakeholder needs, a literature review of various automated cyber penetration systems, 
and a summary of the remaining three chapters. 
A. OVERVIEW 
The goals and objectives of this research as described in the problem statement, 
and the proposed three-tiered approach to solving the problem are provided in this 
section.   
1. Thesis Problem Statement, Goals, and Objectives 
As industry becomes more reliant on complex computer systems using well-
known protocols, it is increasingly important to ensure vulnerabilities are caught and 
corrected early on [1].  A method of addressing this need is to focus on the automation of 
penetration testing in order to reduce the time and manpower required to test well known 
vulnerabilities.  The impact of rising levels of complexity of software and networks 
creates a dynamic environment requiring additional time and effort to adequately adapt 
tools and techniques [1]. 
One approach to detecting vulnerabilities is cyber penetration testing as described 
in a subsequent section of this chapter.  This task is most beneficial to increasing cyber 
security; however, there is a high cost in time, money, and manpower associated with 
manual cyber penetration [1].   
With increased computing power available, intelligent automation is a clear 
choice for simplifying the lives of both administrators and developers.  Actual 
implementation is harder when the long term scalability and evolution of both 
vulnerabilities and exploits must be taken into account.  Data needed to pass information 
between automated systems needs to be standardized into an interoperable data schema.  
To scale, standardize, and automate intelligence, a system of systems methodology to 
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automating cyber penetration testing is needed.  This is the high-level goal and problem 
statement for this thesis. 
To achieve the high-level goal of automating cyber penetration testing, there are 
three objectives for this thesis: (1) use a systems approach to design an architecture that 
automates the tasks of a cyber-penetration operator, (2) design an interoperable data 
storage format to facilitate interpretation automation systems, and (3) implement a proof-
of-concept system of the modeling/design objectives (1) and (2). 
2. Approach to Proposed Solution  
A unique systems solution to the high-level goal of automating cyber 
vulnerability evaluation and penetration of a target network is presented in this thesis.  In 
order to achieve the first objective of systems architecture design for automating a cyber-
penetration system, the Detect, Identify, Predict, React (DIPR) intelligence automation 
model is utilized.  In previous work the DIPR framework has been applied to cyber for 
determining defensive cyber-attacks, where the detect modules attempt to dynamically 
detect cyber red team activity [2]–[5].  In [2], the dynamic defensive cyber sensors were 
Intrusion Detection Systems, and the research focused on the optimal configuration of 
such systems in order to detect and identify states indicative of red team activity.  In 
contrast to [2], the DIPR framework is used in this thesis to detect network activity using 
freeware programs as cyber sensors that are needed in order to sense the vulnerability of 
a network device in the cyber terrain.  This systems approach yields a long term solution 
to automating cyber penetration with the ability for the system to scale by selecting “plug 
and play” cyber penetration tools. It is a system that maximizes the processing the 
computer performs to automatically analyze targets, properly identify vulnerabilities, and, 
finally, perform automated cyber penetration attacks. 
3. DIPR Intelligence Automation System Architecture 
The foundation for creating a scalable and implementable automated system that 
maximizes individual components is to have a clear architecture planned beforehand.  By 
endeavoring to enable any new program to fit and feed into this system a flexible and 
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long lasting tool is produced that can adapt as both vulnerabilities as well as the methods 
for exploiting those vulnerabilities change.   
The approach taken in this thesis is to first generate a system of systems 
architecture for automating cyber penetration testing, which includes both system design 
and design of the needed interoperability standards for the data transmitted between each 
intelligence automation system.  The former is discussed in this section.   
The external systems diagram (ESD) of such a proposed solution is depicted in 
Figure 1.  The external systems are the human operator and the targeted network system 
to be penetrated, denoted as “Cyber Terrain.”  The operator in this case initially is deeply 
involved in developing exploits for specific vulnerabilities to tailor to the DIPR 
Automated Cyber Penetration System.  Subsequent to tool development, the operator is 
involved to a limited extent while the DIPR system is executing, allowing the automated 
system to process and launch the desired exploit.  The operator may choose to validate 
the automated process and provide feedback. 
 
Figure 1.  The DIPR automated cyber penetration system external system. 
Breaking the proposed system into a more detailed view, it is possible to see the 
data flows between the modules as depicted in Figure 2.  The DIPR Automated Cyber 
Penetration System includes four intelligence automation modules that transform cyber 
data from data created when initially sensing the cyber terrain using freeware programs. 
 3 
Data is then transformed into intelligence automation representations associated with the 
four modules of intelligence automation Detect, Identify, Predict, and React (DIPR), 
which are explained in the subsequent section.  Besides the DIPR modules, there are the 
Graphical User Interface (GUI), network and exploit data structures.  The data flow 
begins with an interface between the DIPR system and the cyber terrain that captures the 
data using various freeware programs (Metasploit, NMap, Xprobe2, etc.).  In order for 
the solution to scale and adapt to the disparate nature of the outputs of the various 
freeware programs, a translation step must occur.  Thus, the proposed system’s 
functionality includes the ability to transform these outputs into useable, interoperable 
middleware formats.  Such data structure formats are discussed in the subsequent section. 
 
Figure 2.  The proposed DIPR automated cyber penetration system. 
The graphical user interface serves as the command and control (C2) structure for 
the system.  As each module performs its specific automated task, the GUI automatically 
allows the next module to begin.  This is also where the operator has the option to 
manually select and specify exactly which tasks to accomplish against the chosen target. 
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For the sake of complexity management and storage reduction, only those features 
which are useful to exploits are retained. The Detect module creates a feature database 
per network entity, where a feature of a cyber-entity is considered a technical detail or 
piece of information about that host or network (open port, operating system, etc.) which 
later can be used to analyze that entity.  Detect features are represented and stored in data 
structures as part of the proposed DIPR Intelligence Automation Interoperability 
standards for data representation.  Similarly, the details required for each exploit are 
stored in their own data structure.  These data structures are maintained in a tree 
formatted Extensible Markup Language (XML) document. 
Each of these features is then processed within the Identify module to determine 
vulnerabilities, where an intelligent state can be identified based on a group of specific 
features occurring simultaneously.  If vulnerabilities exist, then that host’s data structure 
is updated accordingly.  Several fused features (i.e., intelligent states) occurring in a 
pattern within a period of time will result in then being classified as a behavior in the 
Predict module. 
After the state sequences are formed and vulnerability behaviors are classified, the 
predict module processes the inferred vulnerability behavior outcome by determining 
which exploits are available against the target.  Based on operator input and likelihood of 
success, a recommended cyber penetration attack is generated and added to the 
vulnerability data structure. 
When the inferred recommendation has been made, the react module uses the 
accumulated data to launch the penetration attack most likely to succeed against the 
target computer. Upon completion, it determines if the attack was successful and feeds 
that information back into the exploit data structure to update the expected probability of 
success for that attack against that vulnerability.  
4. DIPR Intelligence Automation Data Interoperability Standards  
The approach taken in this thesis is to generate a system of systems architecture 
for automating cyber penetration testing, which includes both system design and design 
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of data interoperability standards needed for the data transmitted between each 
intelligence module.  An overview of the latter is discussed in this section.   
The DIPR intelligence automation interoperability standards are used to represent 
data generated by the DIPR modules.  Specific XML schemas are proposed which map to 
the DIPR modules in order to represent data between them.  By implementing 
output/input of DIPR modules using XML files, the DIPR Automated Cyber Penetration 
system can scale with more freeware programs (cyber sensors) and more discovery/react 
tools.  
5. Implemented Proof-of-concept System 
Following the generated architecture, we implement the architecture in a proof-of-
concept system, including software implementations within a virtual network along with 
data interoperability standards implemented using the proposed structured file formats.  
An overview of the proof-of-concept system is provided in this section. 
The final proof-of-concept network was set up with a simple client server 
configuration.  Using freeware together with the backbone architecture, the system sets 
up a man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack, poisoning the network and subsequently 
intercepting the data flowing between the target computer and the webserver.  For each 
success the system updates the exploit database probability of success for that penetration 
attack exploiting that vulnerability.  The starting status for the penetration attack machine 
was a blind entrance onto the network with all target IP addresses unknown.  There was 
one server, one penetration attack box (running a basic version of the architecture 
proposed in this thesis), and a client, which sent information back and forth across the 
network to a web server.  Overall success is determined by the positive integration of 
freeware programs for network discovery and attack as well as successful vulnerability 
analysis and attack prediction. 
Additionally, the GUI and XML schemas and file formats used are described in 
depth in Chapter III. 
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Ultimately, this system does not remove the need for an experienced analyst 
evaluating vulnerabilities or methods of exploiting these vulnerabilities.  It provides a 
new long lasting tool which reduces the time needed to manually test and exploit a 
network.  As operating systems and network traffic change, so will the need for tools 
used to properly identify key vulnerabilities in an exploited system, underscoring the 
importance of being able to add new tools as fluidly and rapidly as possible to the 
program.  This will benefit organizations in operational, tactical, strategic and 
acquisitions positions which have the need to determine, prioritize, and address network 
vulnerabilities of networks quickly and efficiently.  
B. STAKEHOLDER NEED 
The need for this thesis is categorized into the following perspectives: tactical, 
operational, strategic, and acquisition. 
1. Tactical Need 
From a tactical perspective, the Navy Red team deals primarily with gaining 
unauthorized access, testing for vulnerabilities and determining weaknesses of Navy 
networks with the intent of exposing problems for correction [6].  The Red team will 
benefit from this study by having an intelligent automated system reduce time spent 
manually gaining access and probing for weaknesses.  From the vulnerabilities exposed, 
the Navy Blue team, responsible for maintaining and hardening Navy networks against 
malicious penetration, can then endeavor to address and harden those vulnerabilities, 
making the likelihood of successful penetration attack from an outside force less likely [6]. 
2. Operational Need 
From an operational perspective, Tenth Fleet/Fleet Cyber Command, the Navy 
component of U.S. Cyber Command, is responsible for information security, computers 
and cryptologic concerns of the entire Navy, both at sea and on shore [7].  Using the 
information gathered by the Red Team, fleet-wide changes can then be implemented that 
ensure common vulnerabilities are not exploited.  These operational changes will have a 
large impact on fleet security.  
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3. Strategic Need 
From a strategic perspective, two organizations will benefit.  Firstly, the newly 
merged OPNAV N2 (Intelligence)/ N6 (Communications), which is a sister group to 
Tenth Fleet, is responsible for future planning for fleet cyber defense [8].  They will be 
able to take a long term look at current issues to create durable solutions to ensure that 
the navy Cyber community is not solely reactionary.  Knowledge of such an automated 
system will provide OPNAV N2/N6 the opportunity to steer related aspects of the science 
and technology (S&T) of this area in cyber by demonstrating the ability to quickly 
determine system vulnerabilities as an important component of future networks as a 
watchdog for emerging cyber vulnerabilities.  Secondly, USCYBERCOM will benefit 
from this tool as an aid in strategic cyber mission planning across all services [7]. 
4. Acquisitions Need 
From an acquisitions perspective, the Program Executive Office Command and 
Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (PEO C4I and PMW 130), 
dedicated to providing products dedicated to information security and cyber defense for 
the fleet, along with other PMWs in PEO C4I, will be aided from the acquisitions 
approach to cyber systems in the Navy’s C4ISR systems [9]. 
C. BACKGROUND 
General background on intelligence automation, penetration testing, and field 
experience with penetration operators is provided in this section.  
1. Detect, Identify, Predict, React Intelligence Automation 
The intelligence automation model used in this thesis implements the DIPR 
automation model and has been used primarily in sensor based networks to generate useable, 
intelligent feedback from raw data provided by conventional sensors such as cameras [11].  It 
has been used once before for automating dynamic defensive cyber operations (DCO), which 
focused primarily on the cyber sensors and detection portions [2]. 
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a. Detect Subsystem 
Starting with a standard system there are basic sensors in the field feeding 
raw data back to a processing center running the DIPR program.  From here the raw 
sensor data is analyzed, and raw features are created in a Detect Subsystem.  As 
previously discussed, features are a low level classification created from raw data [11].  
b. Identify Subsystem 
From this point, the Identify Subsystem processes the features, recognizes 
when multiple features have occurred simultaneously and fuses them together, generating 
a state to which that data belongs.  Rules to implement the recognition must be developed 
ahead of time to determine what features are required but, ideally, it would be an 
adaptable learning system which could tailor itself over time [11]. 
c. Predict Subsystem 
The state generated by the Identify Subsystem is then input into the 
Predict Subsystem. These states are then mapped and generalized to create high-level 
classifiers which use the inputs of states, location and time to develop sequences or 
behaviors.  They are then classified as “normal” behaviors, “abnormal” behaviors and 
“unclassified” behaviors based on predefined or learned patterns.  These behaviors are 
then used to predict the future state of the system under observation and output to the 
React Subsystem [11].  
d. React Subsystem 
Once handed to the React Subsystem, these predicted behaviors are acted upon.  
The output of the React Subsystem is an action appropriate to the predicted behavior 
(warnings, alarms, etc.) [11].  
In general, the DIPR system is well-suited for application to the cyber field.  In 
Chapter II, more specific adaptations are addressed as to how the sensors and terrain are 
described and mapped to work in this model.   
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2. Cyber Penetration Testing 
Cyber Penetration testing is generally the action of a system administrator or 
software engineer deliberately searching for vulnerabilities and determining what 
information can be determined about their system.  Manually performing this process is 
extremely time consuming and, generally, only results in determining that those specific 
tests were unable to find any vulnerabilities.  To ease the burden of this process, many 
suites and programs have been developed to automatically perform a subset of some of 
those tasks, but in certain cases can these programs be linked together to form a more 
robust system. 
Penetration testing both during the software development process as well as at the 
final production point is crucial to ensuring an end product with limited vulnerabilities.  
A concern in particular for the software development industry is the trade-off between 
manual and automatic penetration testing.  While manual testing is perhaps more 
thorough, it is vastly more time and processing power intensive, and basic automation has 
the limitation of only finding the specific vulnerabilities which it is programmed to find.   
Penetration testing in general is limited in its efficacy due to the fact that it does not 
prove that a system does not have vulnerabilities, simply that it does not have any of the 
vulnerabilities that were specifically searched for.  In many cases this might be sufficient 
for the first release with any subsequent problems being addressed in patches.  To this 
end, several freeware programs have been developed in order to minimize the amount of 
time taken to manually penetration test a network.  In this thesis we focus on well-known 
freeware programs.  All have the ability to both scan and attack, and both aspects are 
employed in the final integration of the system.  
The specific people who are interested in using the DIPR Automated Cyber 
Penetration System likely come from a fairly specialized niche of hackers.  The term 
“hacker” in the context of this thesis refers to someone who can gain access to a 
computer network without using the standard methods defined by the organization’s 
policy.  Hackers have a wide variety of motivations for accessing a system and what they 
will do if successful.  As new technology and software enters the market, new flaws and 
 10 
security vulnerabilities similarly emerge.  The market for finding and fixing these flaws 
has grown in proportion to how prevalent technology has become.  
The first type of person who would be intent on exploiting these flaws is a “black 
hat” hacker.  Black hatters enter into a system without authorization and steal information 
or damage the system in some way [12].  They can be anyone from a script kiddie to an 
elite corporate hacker looking for secrets.  The tools they use could range from freeware 
to personally written and scripted code tailored to enter into a system [12].  Black hatters 
are what most organizations fear and, therefore, expend considerable resources ensuring 
that they are either adequately protected or repairing damage after realizing that they 
were not. 
The second type, on the opposite side of the spectrum, would be the “white hat” 
or “ethical hacker.” They are typically hired by a company to look for flaws in the system 
and determine what vulnerabilities exist [12].  They use any tools at their disposal to 
attempt to break into the system the same way a black hatter does so that they may find as 
many flaws as possible and help the company correct them or guard against them [12].  
This system in particular can help them use a wide variety of freeware tools to quickly, in 
various combinations, launch attacks and determine which have the highest chances of 
success.  Because they are being paid by the company for results, it is most profitable to 
execute as many attacks and avenues as rapidly as possible.   However, this brings up one 
of the primary flaws in cyber security: the entire process is one of exclusion.  A tool or 
person can prove that the method that they used does not work, but it is impossible to 
prove that there exists no method which could work.  It is a fundamental flaw and is one 
of the reasons that well planned security from the initial development of every program 
or network is essential.  Automated tools will not fix this flaw but can greatly increase the 
number of common attacks launched using the most common tools directed against a 
network in various combinations. 
The third type falls somewhere in between the two extremes and, aptly, is called a 
“grey hat” hacker.  These are typically people that illegally enter a network and find 
flaws in the system but, instead of exploiting or damaging the network, inform the 
company of the issue so that they may correct it [12].  Motivations for this type of person 
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are varied and unpredictable.  This system could also be useful for grey hatters with the 
added benefit of not leaving any additional footprints outside of what is normal for 
freeware programs being used manually.  For instance, if a hacker were to specifically 
tailor code to break into a bank’s computer network, they leave a specific signature 
behind that may link their code to them and any other instances of that code.  However, 
with an automated system utilizing only freeware programs, it is more difficult to discern 
a specific person manually running the programs while still providing the added benefit 
of decreased time. 
3. Field Experience with Cyber Penetration Operators 
During the 2012 Joint Interagency Field Experimentation (JIFX) held at Camp 
Roberts in February, the author met with several of the Navy cyber red team members.  
These people were tasked with finding vulnerabilities of specific projects using typical 
freeware programs available to the general public.  In some cases they knew well in 
advance what program they would be acting against and, in others, they were told with 
little or no time to prepare.  When given sufficient lead time for research, they employed 
a flow chart (as seen in Figure 3) or checklist to find as much information about the 
system beforehand as possible.  This resulted in consistently  documentable and traceable 
results which lent itself to better corrections by the programs security team.  They 
expressed an interest in automated tools to easily combine freeware programs and to help 
more quickly move step by step through the process.  Throughout the exercise they 
typically used more than six different programs to find and utilize information about the 
target system and to determine the most successful avenue of approach.  From this initial 
assessment, they would use a series of other freeware programs to launch attacks.  In the 
case of new programs where little prior knowledge was available, this process was 
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Figure 3.  Assessment scenario flow chart. From [13]. 
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Ultimately, this system will benefit the Navy by assisting people in red team roles 
by quickly assessing and determining weaknesses in new programs prior to them being 
pushed into the Fleet.   
D. LITERATURE SEARCH 
Several other efforts to automate cyber penetration are described and middleware 
implementation recommendations are made in this section. 
1. Penetration Testing 
The paper by J.P. McDermott, “Attack Net Penetration Testing,” discusses 
various methodologies of finding, approaching, and eliminating programming flaws [10].  
In the case of this thesis, the intent is only to find and exploit flaws, but the process 
remains the same.  The “flaw hypothesis approach” breaks down the process into a series 
of steps: 1. define goals, 2. background research, 3. generate hypothetical vulnerabilities, 
4. confirm vulnerabilities, 5. generalize flaws, 6. eliminate flaws [10].  For the purpose of 
this thesis, we begin at step six of this approach, maximize the flaw and then exploit the 
flaw. McDermott’s view of using an attack net for a MiTM attack is consistent with the 
structure of this thesis’; although, he pursued a different end goal.  The concept of an 
attack net is each previous step must be completed to unlock access to the following step, 
which in turn allows access to the next step and so forth to the goal. This is modeled by 
portraying intermediate and final objectives as places or nodes on a map, commands and 
inputs as transitions between these nodes, and using “tokens” as placeholders for the 
current position in the map [10]. In an ideal situation, it is possible to either find a simpler 
path to the goal or make it possible that, on a second attack, the path is left open for 
further exploitation using this methodology.  
2. XML as Middleware 
Choosing an efficient, scalable method for storing information is the focus of the 
article “XML Data Stores: Emerging Practices” [14]. Because of XML’s ease of use, 
interoperability and reliability, it has increasingly become the data store of choice for the 
programming industry [14].  The implementation of these XML data stores can vary from 
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application to application, and there are a variety of benefits to the various methods.  
Options discussed were: ASCII files stored in a management system as objects, relational 
database management system (DBMS) (Tables), object relational DBMS (tables and 
objects), native XML, and directory servers [14].  Given the various pros and cons of the 
preceding options, using a native XML has the qualities of scalability, reliability and data 
access speed. Native XML is defined as a data store that uses XML as its fundamental 
storage unit, uses a logical model for the XML itself, and requires a specific physical 
storage method [14]. Information can then be stored either in a tree format or a collection 
format.  Both are valid methods and best practice is determined by the needs of the 
application.  A tree stores the data in a parent child configuration, whereas the collection 
method groups them in larger sets using either a typed schema [6] or as untyped unrelated 
XML documents [14].  The use of a Native XML inherent to the application as well as a 
tree storage method was the method utilized in this thesis. 
3. San Jose State University Automated Penetration System 
The thesis Automated Penetration Testing by Neha Samant examines the need for 
automated penetration testing to reduce the time and cost of manually performing the 
penetration testing [15].  By performing penetration testing early and often in either the 
network development or software development stages, it is easier and less  
time-consuming to identify or correct issues as opposed to waiting until the system is 
finalized [15]. The paper developed a web-based penetration system to create a variety of 
user friendly denial of service (DoS) attacks.  The application was successful in 
accomplishing basic DoS attacks using three protocols: hypertext transfer protocol 
(HTTP), session initiation protocol (SIP) and transmission control protocol/Internet 
protocol (TCP/IP).  For each protocol two to twenty attacks were available. The user 
friendly interface takes the input of the IP address to be attacked and a port number to 
direct that attack.  The application successfully completed these attacks with a user 
friendly interface that simplified penetration testing as opposed to performing the attacks 
manually. 
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Weaknesses in this method are limited scalability in the future and the continuing 
need to use external programs to gather information prior to attack.  With no previously 
established architecture, the application development is constrained and possibly limited 
in efficiency.  The lack of integration with a port or IP discovery program reduces the 
scope and degree of intelligent automation of the system.  The focus of this thesis is on 
creating an architecture that can be put in place prior to development of the web 
application to ensure long term scalability as well as integrating programs to fully 
automate the system.   
4. HackSim System 
Another implementation of penetration testing called HackSim was created to 
automate penetration testing for remote buffer overflow vulnerabilities [16].  By 
developing an architecture that focused on discovery and exploit (similar to this thesis’s 
discovery and attack programs), they created a modular approach which focused on a 
user-friendly interface, automation and safety for the target program. Designed to work 
either in a white box (tester has a priori knowledge of the system) or black box (tester has 
no a priori knowledge of the system) environment testing, the intent was to sanitize code 
used for penetration, ensuring that while the system was tested it would not be damaged 
and no backdoors were inadvertently left in place.  This allowed the system or network to 
be tested while still in operation, a situation which frequently occurs in the commercial 
world after a new program or function has been installed on the network.  The system 
was successfully implemented against Solaris and Windows systems.   
Hacksim does have the ability to be expanded and scaled to larger 
implementations but has to be manually coded [16].  This limits how advanced and time 
relevant this framework would be long term.  In this specific framework, there was little 
reason for standardization of the implementation of either the discovery or exploit 
modules.  However, this could result in difficulties in a more advanced implementation. 
In addition to similarly working to automate penetration testing, the intent of this 
thesis is to focus on implementing the intelligence between the discovery and exploit 
steps. 
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5. Solar Sword System 
A third implementation, named Solar Sword, is the closest to the scope of this 
thesis [17]. Using an automated, modular system they developed a distributed network of 
secure information gathering platforms to feedback information to a central command 
and control center [17]. The three focus areas for this implementation are automation, 
distribution and immunity from external attacks.  The approach uses the distributed 
program on a LiveDVD system to run programs to determine information about the 
network and send that information back to the central station [17].  The central station 
processes the information, determines the best course of attack based on possible 
vulnerabilities and generates a template for attack which is disseminated to the distributed 
testing clients.  After retrieval the clients launch the attacks and generate reports about 
the success of the attack.  These are then sent back to the central control station for 
manual analysis [17].   
This method uses a standardized approach to its attack template as well as 
utilizing the information sent back from the distributed clients, which provided more 
information from a wider range of vantage points.  This allows for error checking 
gathered data and for potentially harvesting more information depending on distributed 
client vantage point [17].  Additionally, its use of automation and intelligence to parse the 
received information and process it through either an attack net or attack graph allows it 
to adapt to a previously unknown network and determine the best course of testing.  The 
implementation was successful in achieving its goals and future work was determined to 
be necessary in the areas of increasing the automation and intelligence in its attack graph 
and securing the communications between the central control center and its distributed 
clients [17].  Finally, they concluded that further work needed to be done to make the 
implementation more robust.  In Solar Sword, an approach to designing a methodology 
which was also scalable and easily upgradeable to new exploits is important and 
achievable but is not a primary focus for Solar Sword [17]. 
A different approach is taken in this thesis by emphasizing modularity in order to 
change to a rapidly developing environment while focusing on using premade freeware 
programs to do the majority of the work for the penetration tester.  The use of the 
freeware programs frees much of the burden of relying on native scripts and exploits to 
test the system. 
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6. Conclusions from Literature Search 
Based on the above literature search, the focus of this thesis is on establishing a 
DIPR based architecture using a methodical approach to flaw recognition and 
exploitation.  Using XML as the data store format, we integrate disparate freeware 
programs into a scalable system which allows future expansion and reliability.  
A comparison of each reviewed implementation as compared to each of our focus 
areas is illustrated in Table 1. Primarily, these areas are scalability, standardization and 
intelligence. In the context of this thesis, scalability refers to the ability of the 
implementation to easily adapt to additional growth of the network or of desired exploits.  
This can typically be seen by a modular architecture but is not limited to this. Manually 
coding or developing each vulnerability can also significantly limit the scalability due to 
the time and cost associated with manual coding and detecting.  To a certain extent, 
avoiding manual coding is impossible, but steps such as standardization and intelligence 
can reduce this work.  Standardization refers to making any inputs to modules used or 
information gained to classify vulnerabilities as having similar classifications for their 
attributes. Intelligence refers to the ability to mesh several details or vulnerabilities in 
order to recognize a new and different vulnerability. This can also refer to the ability to 
self-recognize or adapt to given inputs. 
Table 1.   Comparison of literature review solutions to proposed DIPR solution. 
 Scalability Standardization Intelligence 
San Jose State University Implementation  X  
HackSim X   
Solar Sword  X X 
Proposed DIPR Implementation X X X 
 
Focus areas lacking from the other implementations is the concept of intelligently 
automating the system to allow it to recognize multiple aspects and identify them as a 
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more advanced vulnerability.  Standardization was not necessary in all of the 
implementations but was not discussed as a key point either.  Each implementation had a 
unique approach, and all were successful in their stated goals but a more structured, well 
defined architecture can assist in the automation process. 
E. THESIS STRUCTURE 
The stakeholder need driving this thesis was articulated in Chapter I followed by 
the general background required for this thesis.  A literature search on other efforts in 
automating penetration testing concluded the chapter.  The recommended architecture of 
the DIPR Automated Cyber Penetration System are described in Chapter II.  The 
software implementation for the proof-of-concept system of the proposed DIPR 
Automated Cyber Penetration System and discussion of the results of that 
implementation are described in Chapter III.  Finally, recommended improvements to the 
proof-of-concept, future work and conclusions are provided in Chapter IV. 
F. SUMMARY 
A general overview of the need to develop a scalable, flexible architecture for the 
automation of network penetration and exploitation was presented in this chapter. Detail 
on the overall thesis structure, stakeholder needs, background behind the chosen 
architecture and a summary of additional literature in this area was provided.  Further 
details on the development of this architecture are addressed in Chapter II. 
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II. A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO INTELLIGENCE AUTOMATED 
CYBER PENETRATION  
The proposed methodology for automatic penetration testing and exploitation 
management within a cyber system of systems framework is the focus of this chapter.  
The systems framework is depicted in Figure 4. There are two external systems to the 
DIPR Automated Cyber Penetration System: the cyber terrain that is to be penetrated and 
the operator.  The external systems, the DIPR Automated Cyber Penetration System, and 
the information flows between each system are described in detail in the following 
sections. 
  
Figure 4.  DIPR automated cyber penetration model external systems. 
A. CYBER TERRAIN  
With most cyber scenarios, the primary issue is to clearly delineate where the 
terrain of the problem begins and ends.  In this thesis that boundary is set at the outputs of 
our sensors (freeware programs which are discussed more in depth further on) which feed 
into our system.  This clearly establishes that the sensors themselves are not integrated 
into the system (with the exception of input commands) but instead only the outputs must 
be manipulated to conform.  This ensures that we prevent creating a fingerprint, allowing 
an outside observer to realize the system is automated vice a person manually performing 
the operations.  The assumption is that the attack computer has a physical connection to 
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the target network.  For this thesis, cyber terrain is broken into two separate categories: 
network-based terrain and host-based terrain [3].  Both are ideally utilized, but only the 
network-based terrain is featured in the proof-of-concept. 
1. Network-based Cyber Terrain 
Network-based cyber terrain can be considered any physical connection to a 
device on the network (node) as well as each network connection combination between 
any two nodes on the network (edges) [3].  To gather information in a network-based 
cyber terrain, our system sends out data in order to process and receive data to determine 
features or behaviors of the target system. Examples of network terrain include 
computers, routers, storage systems and the physical connections between them which 
make up the network itself. Knowledge about the terrain is limited to that which can be 
gathered by our sensors. 
2. Host-based Cyber Terrain 
Host-based cyber terrain differs from network-based by how the information is 
obtained by our system.  In a host-based cyber terrain, the target computer, with the 
implementation of a previously installed back door, processes and determines features 
and behaviors itself and send that information to our system. Data gathered by the host-
based terrain can be considered all the information regarding one device on the network 
(the internals of the device) which does not normally get transmitted between two nodes 
on the network [3].  Examples of information in a host-based cyber terrain include the 
system logs, the number of processes running, and the CPU utilization on a given 
computer.   
Unlike the network-based cyber terrain, the host-based requires an advanced 
implementation where a program or malware created by one of our freeware programs 
has left a backdoor in place to later retrieve information.  Here it is assumed that the 
target computer is sending information and establishing a connection without being 
prompted by the attack computer. 
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B. OPERATOR 
Automation of a penetration system, regardless of how advanced or well 
implemented, never completely alleviates the need for a human analyst to help find new 
vulnerabilities.  The system is only able to automate at the level to which it is 
programmed. Additionally, in order to ensure that the correct target is chosen and acted 
against, it is always wise to ensure that a human component can be inserted into the 
process.  In this thesis, the operator has several roles as described subsequently. 
1. Operator Inputs 
The involvement of the operator for this architecture is discussed in this section.  
Both the expectations for initial exploit development as well as the expected received 
inputs and outputs are explained. 
a. Initial Exploit Development 
Research into system vulnerabilities is the first step in the process for 
exploiting a system or network.  After a program or system is launched, the most likely 
source of bugs or flaws is the end-users.  Extensive time and development is directed 
towards debugging programs before they are released into the market, but invariably, 
there are a few issues that still crop up.  Those users who find the issues may provide this 
information to the company, exploit the flaws themselves, or just post the information on 
various blogs or message boards.  As a result, it is valuable for a tester to regularly peruse 
these boards and look for new exploits or flaws which may further provide access to a 
system.  In this thesis it is expected that an operator or analyst populates a database ahead 
of time with possible vulnerabilities with as many details as possible about a system that 
the vulnerability applies to and what the expected result is for those actions.  The validity 
of this database is paramount in executing a successful automated attack.   
b. Assessment Inputs 
Determining and tracking the success or failure of an exploit on a system 
with a particular vulnerability is essential to correctly choosing which exploits to utilize 
in future cases.  For this thesis this information is provided by the user.  Further 
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development on automating methods of effectiveness aids in removing this input, but 
some human interaction should be involved to monitor the quality of the attack.  
2. Outputs to the Operator 
Primarily, the outputs for the system are the status of what step of the process the 
system is performing so that the user can choose to monitor outputs.  This is to provide 
situational awareness of the status of the automated system to the operator.  Additional 
monitoring of the network is expected through a program such as Wireshark or tcpdump 
to view the effectiveness of a network based attack.  
C. DIPR AUTOMATED CYBER PENETRATION SYSTEM 
A general description of how each component is structured, followed by a more 
in-depth look at the data flow within each module and from one module to another, is 
discussed in this section. 
1. Freeware Programs (Cyber Sensors) 
The DIPR architecture has primarily been implemented in the automation of 
standard physical sensors feeding back to artificial intelligence software. In this system 
we are moving from the physical environment to the cyber environment. As such, the 
definitions of each component change slightly; although, the intended goal remains the 
same. 
The DIPR cyber sensors are considered to be the probes sent from the programs 
used by the penetration software.  They represent the interface that our attack computer 
has with the target network.  Just as there are two types of cyber terrain, there are two 
categories of cyber sensors.  Those determining information about network based 
information and those that interact with implants on network computers (to extract 
information about the host) which can send back information.  For this thesis, host based 
sensors are not implemented but should be mentioned as another crucial sensor in a fully 
fleshed out implementation.  Network based sensor data can be thought of as the data 
being sent from the attack computer to elicit a response in the target computer.  For 
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example, packet captures from TCP or ICMP probes are sensor data from the network-
based cyber sensors NMAP and XProbe2, respectively. 
Additionally, further delineation must be made between the actual roles of each 
program.  Penetration testing can be seen as two separate functions.  The first function is 
a discovery function, responsible for exfiltrating information about the network.  Second 
is an attack function which is responsible for disrupting, intercepting or denying some 
service.  Programs used are associated with these functions for use in this system, and it 
is possible that a single freeware program can serve in either role.  A more through 
discussion of specific programs is addressed in Chapter III. 
a. Discovery Programs 
Discovery programs can also later double in the React module as attack 
programs depending on the robustness of the freeware program.  In general, a discovery 
program is any program that can elicit information from the network.  This can also be 
either honed down in the event that the target IP address is known (i.e., instead of 
scanning the entire network it specifically targets a single computer) or bypassed entirely 
if enough information is already known on the target. 
b. Attack Programs 
Attack programs are any type of freeware that take inputs and then launch 
a specific attack against the network.    
c. Requirements for Freeware Programs 
To make an architecture which is scalable, limitations on what the system 
can or cannot accept in its freeware program has to be balanced with ensuring that the full 
range of programs are utilized.  Current network toolboxes such as Metasploit are readily 
available and easy to use. Developing Metasploit plugins that allow toolboxes to interact 
with this architecture is necessary but should be done cautiously such that the final output 
does not look automated when processed through our system. 
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Because of the requirement to have systems that interact directly with our 
system, any discovery program used must have a command line interface available and 
output that can be piped or parsed such that it can be converted into a standardized XML 
format.  Any attack program used only needs to have command line input; although, a 
parseable output is useful for determining success. 
2. DIPR Intelligence Automation Interoperability Standards 
Because XML is both ubiquitous as well as extremely versatile from both a 
human readable and machine readable perspective, it has been chosen for this thesis as 
the primary method of data storage in all applications.  The standardization of XML 
fields allows for synchronization of data between disparate programs, which increases the 
information available about a particular network while reducing the redundant 
information taking up storage. 
a. Network Entity XML 
The XML file created which holds all data pertaining to a specific entity 
on the network (i.e., computer, router, storage device, connection, etc.) is referred to as a 
network entity XML.  An example is provided in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.  Example network entity XML. 
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b. Exploit XML 
Prior to beginning the DIPR process, an exploit database must be created 
associating vulnerabilities with possible exploits that can take advantage of these 
vulnerabilities.  For this thesis this database is stored as an XML file and referred to as 
the exploit XML.  An example exploit XML is provided in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6.  Example exploit XML. 
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3. GUI (Command and Control Interface) 
A robust GUI is necessary in order to ensure that all of the options available to the 
individual freeware programs are still accessible in the integrated system.  Additionally, 
this is where most of the hand over and command and control occur.  Having a GUI 
which still allows the operator to be inserted at any point in the process is also desirable 
both from a verification standpoint as well as to ensure no actions are taken without 
understanding the consequences.  The data flow for the GUI is shown in Figure 7.  It 
interfaces directly with the four modules and the operator.  To maintain modularity, the 
GUI should have no connections to external programs.  
 
 
Figure 7.  GUI data flow. 
4. Detect Identify Predict React (DIPR) Modules 
The tasks assigned to each module and the separation of control for each module 
is the focus of this section.  An overall flow diagram for the modules as a whole is 




Figure 8.  DIPR automated cyber penetration system. 
a. Detect Module 
The detect module has four primary tasks: 
• Run the discovery program 
• Parse the output of the discovery program. 
• Create an XML document per network entity 
• Make/update a master network entity list  
As shown in Figure 7, the flow begins with the GUI calling on the Detect 
module with either the name of the specific requested discovery program or with no 
input, allowing the module to use the default.  Once the program is run, the output is 
parsed to gather only the necessary features.  Necessary features are determined by the 
vulnerabilities stated in the exploit XML.  This parsed information is then used to create a 
standardized XML file for each network entry with additional information of MAC 
address, timestamp and program used to gather the information.  Finally, the Detect 
module creates a master list of all network entities for faster reference in follow on 
modules. When complete, the module returns a signal to the GUI that it has finished and 
the next module can take over. 
 29 
 
Figure 9.  Detect module flow. 
b. Identify Module 
The Identify module similarly has multiple primary tasks: 
• Pull features needed for a state from exploit XML file (setting up 
the query) 
• Open each network XML and test to see if the query is true 
• Update network XML to indicate that a state exists and what 
vulnerability it corresponds to. 
When the GUI calls on the Identify module, it first looks to the exploit 
XML file to determine what features are needed to be combined in order to make a state.  
This can also be seen as building the queries.  Then it applies those queries to each of the 
network entities.  For instance if “a” and “b” features are needed for state 0 with a 
vulnerability “c” (this is the query) and the network entity has both “a” and “b”, then the 
XML is updated that that entity is in state 0 with vulnerability “c.” State 0 is used to 
denote that the entity has a vulnerability that can be exploited.  A State 1 or higher 
indicator can occur in the event that a backdoor has been left on the machine from a 
previous engagement.  The difference between these two is what allows for further 
determination of behavior patterns for that entity.  Finally, it returns to the GUI that it has 
completed successfully. This flow can be seen in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10.  Identify module flow. 
c. Predict Module 
The tasks for the Predict module are: 
• Find all possible exploits for each vulnerability 
• Check each network entity for the existence of State 0 
• Calculate the probability for each type of exploit available for that 
vulnerability 
• Determine if additional information or vulnerabilities are required 
for that type of attack 
• Update network entity XML with recommendation and 
requirements for the exploit with the highest probability 
In Figure 11, we can see the flow of information in the Predict module.  
When triggered by the GUI, the Predict module takes the exploit XML file and reads in 
the possible exploits for each type of vulnerability.  Then it calculates the probability of 
success for each type of attack.  Probability can be dependent on different variables such 
as whether the desired response is the most likely to succeed, produce the desired 
outcome (MiTM or DoS) or least likely to be detected. The Predict module should have 
the ability to discern which exploit fits the request best.  The module should then look 
 
through all the entity XMLs and find which have a State 0 and update them with the 
recommended exploits for that vulnerability and any additional requirements. Finally, it 
should inform the GUI that it has completed its tasks. 
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Figure 11.  Predict module flow. 
d. React Module 
The tasks for the React module are: 
• Inspect all network entity XMLs and find the exploit with the 
highest probability. 
• If additional requirements are needed, find them. 
• Launch attack using all available information. 
• Update the network entity XML with a timestamp of the attack. 
• Update the exploit XML with Success or failure. 
In Figure 10, the flows for the React module are shown.  It begins with the 
GUI starting the process, triggering the module to look at all of the entity XMLs to 
determine the exploit with the highest probability of attack.  The returned exploit may 
then have another requirement (another vulnerability or specific piece of information).  In 
that case the module checks to see if that additional condition exists.  If it does then it 
launches the chosen attack using the selected attack program.  If it does not then it repeats 
the search process and chooses the exploit with the next highest probability of success.  
After the attack is launched, it updates the entity XML and the exploit XML to reflect the 
success or failure of the attack. This data flow is shown by Figure 12. 
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Figure 12.  React module flows. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
Conclusions on the systems approach to intelligence automated cyber penetration 
testing were provided and two important points that were considered while making the 
architectural choices to utilize the DIPR process specifically and freeware programs in 
general are identified in this section.  
1. Desire for Stealth 
One of the frustrations when trying to reverse engineer an attack is determining 
who sent the code that caused the damage to your system.  One method a grey hatter can 
use to avoid identification or finger-printing of themselves is to only use freeware or 
publicly owned code.  This has two consequences: ease of use which allows the operator 
to spend less time specifically tailoring code and “recreating the wheel” for a particular 
exploit and, more importantly, it makes it marginally harder to connect that particular 
version of the code with the specific operator.    
2. Growth and Standardization 
Plug and play programming driven by the use of XML is a focal point for 
determining a recommended method for formatting and standardizing the outputs of 
individual programs.  Because each new program on the market is unlikely to use a 
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similar output method, there needs to be a standardized process that allows easy 
integration with new freeware programs.  Determination of specific events and features 
are stored and expandable as more utilities are used and advanced vulnerabilities are 
identified.  Ease of access and a small footprint assists in maximizing the computational 
speed of the program and allows for faster real time execution in determining the best 
exploit for deployment. 
3. Summary 
An overall methodology for implementing the DIPR system was proposed and the 
needs of the specific components were addressed in this chapter. The expected data flows 
externally between the terrain, operator and the DIPR system and the internal data flows 
between each of these sections were discussed.  Proof-of-concept considerations and 
implementations are further addressed in Chapter III. 
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III. PROOF-OF-CONCEPT 
The overall creation and development of the proof-of-concept are discussed in 
this chapter.  The methods used to choose freeware, determine the network the proof-of-
concept was built upon and how each module was designed to work as an overall whole 
as well the results of each step of the proof-of-concept are covered. 
A. FREEWARE SELECTION 
The process for selecting the freeware programs that are used in the development 
of the proof-of-concept are discussed in this section. 
1. Discovery Programs 
A discovery program is any program that can elicit information from the network.  
This can be either honed down in the event that the target IP address is known (i.e., 
instead of scanning the entire network it specifically targets a single computer) or 
bypassed entirely if enough information is already known about the target. Requirements 
for these programs are that they have command line input as well as a form of parseable 
output. Possible choices are discussed in the following sections.  There are many others 
that are available, but these present a general list. 
a. Network Mapping (NMap) 
NMap is a small freeware program which uses erroneous TCP packets 
with various flags set to attempt to fingerprint the operating system (OS) of the targeted 
computer.  The OS determination is made based on the types of replies the target system 
returns from each erroneous packet.  From these replies, an estimate is made as to what 
OS is most likely running on the target system [18].  When the version of the target 
system is known, we have achieved the first step in determining what potential 
vulnerabilities might be available.  A limitation of NMap is that it is relatively “noisy”, 
and the erroneous packets can likely be noticed by an intrusion detection system (IDS) or 
system administrator.  Possible methods of avoiding this are to provide a dummy IP 
address or to use a less obtrusive program.  In the case of white hat attacks, this is 
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unnecessary, but in a situation where stealth is required, this could lead to detection.  
Additionally, NMap can be used for basic network mapping, which is important when the 
target IP address is not known from the beginning. 
NMAP was specifically used by the proof-of-concept as the discovery program.   
b. Ettercap 
Ettercap has the ability to actively and passively gather information using 
a MiTM attack [19] but typically outputs less information while setting up an attack and 
so is not considered ideal as a discovery program.  It was, however, used as a final attack 
program. 
c. Metasploit 
Another well-known example of both a discovery as well as an attack 
program is Metasploit [20].  Metasploit has a well-developed interface with many 
services to both test for vulnerabilities in addition to exploiting the vulnerabilities once 
found.  The program was created in 2003 by HD Moore and has grown in recent years to 
be one of the most hardy scanning and exploitation tools on the market [20].  Metasploit 
streamlines many of the day-to-day penetration steps and allows them to be viewed in a 
flow like GUI format.  Many of the basic steps can be understood and followed by a basic 
user, but more advanced tools must be fully understood to achieve the full potential of the 
program.  The intent behind this thesis is not to replicate a less robust version of this 
program but to propose an architecture such that any program may interface with the 
primary program without needing to specifically become an add on to the main program. 
This allows for the integration of any new tool that is on the market regardless of the 
code’s source. 
2. Attack Programs 
Attack programs are required to take an input and launch a specific attack against 
the target network or computer.  Depending on the desire of the operator, they can have a 
wide variety of results. 
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a. Ettercap 
Ettercap is a simple freeware program that is supported in Linux and 
Windows up to XP.  It is primarily used to launch a MiTM attack using ARP poisoning 
and ICMP poisoning [19]. Its inputs can be virtually any combination of IP address, 
MAC Address and ports; that allows it to be easily tailored to specific needs. Its output 
does not provide much parseable information, but in conjunction with tcpdump or 
Wireshark, intercepted packets can be captured and reviewed.  For the proof-of-concept, 
Ettercap was used primarily for its simplicity in command line inputs as well as the 
variety of input combinations available. 
b. Cain & Able 
Cain & Able is a freeware program primarily used to gather passwords 
and map networks.  Its methodology ranges from brute force or dictionary attacks to 
more advanced decoding and descrambling.  Its most recent version can also be used for 
ARP poisoning a network and MiTM attacks [21].  Cain & Able was not used the in the 
proof-of-concept only because in the Windows environment it has limited command line 
input.  Using an implementation of the architecture in Linux would make the Cain and 
Able another valid program to consider integrating. 
c. Denial of Service (DoS) Attack 
While not implemented in the proof-of-concept, a DoS attack is one of the 
most simple to implement and difficult to defend against attacks.  It can be implemented 
using numerous methods, but the most common is to flood a system with some form of 
packet and overwhelm the server or even the network itself [22].  One end goal for this 
attack is to clog the network to the point where services are inoperable or time latent.  
3. Conclusions on Freeware Programs 
For both their simplicity as well as their robustness, NMap and Ettercap were 
implemented in this proof-of-concept.  Overall success or failure needs to be verified via 
Wireshark or tcpdump and input by the operator, but the validity of the architecture holds 
even with this limitation.  
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B. NETWORK ARCHITECTURE 
A detailed description of the network designed to test the proof-of-concept is 
given in the following section.  This includes a description of topology, software and 
computer specifications. 
1. Topology 
The network was designed in a virtual environment and consisted of three virtual 
machines (VM) and a network data storage device.  A visual of the network topology is 
provided in Figure 13.   
 
Figure 13.  Network topology. 
2. Software and Computer Specifications 
The “Attack Box,” or the machine running the proof-of-concept system, was 
named Panthro and runs Windows XP with the necessary freeware programs and python 
installed.  
The “Target” machine was similarly running Windows XP with only Wireshark 
and Internet Explorer installed.  Internet Explorer was used to generate traffic to ensure 
the MiTM attack was operating correctly and Wireshark for troubleshooting and to 
inspect the packets at the receiving end. 
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The “Webserver” machine ran  an Apache webserver and hosted the webpage that 
the target computer accesses.   
The terastation was the only non-virtual component of the network and was used 
to back up the virtual machines. 
Python was chosen to write all of the code for the proof-of-concept because it is a 
high level programming language with the ability to process command line input while 
handling parsing of text files.  It also has inherent toolboxes for both GUI development as 
well as XML manipulation. 
C. DIPR INTELLIGENCE AUTOMATION STANDARDS USING XML 
FILES 
The components and details that went into developing the standardization used to 
create the exploit and network entity XMLs are discussed in this section.  Standardization 
is essential in allowing multiple disparate DIPR programs interface efficiently so that 
they may be processed by the architecture. 
1. Exploit XML 
An example of vulnerability in the exploits XML document is depicted in Figure 
14.  The vulnerability field names the vulnerability in this example “A”.  This is the 
primary method for labeling the various vulnerabilities that could be found. The naming 
convention can be substituted for a more complex or descriptive method but increased 
complexity makes it more likely for error while integrating several programs seamlessly.  
The aspect field determines the general attribute that is being searched for (i.e., operating 
system, open port, IP address, etc.) and should be directly related to information that can 
be provided by a discovery program.  The spec field refers to the specific value that 
should be held by the aspect field.  Multiple spec and aspect fields are possible for any 
vulnerability. Each aspect requires at least one spec value be true for the vulnerability to 
be considered true.  Alternately, it is an “and” operator for aspects and an “or” operator 
for specs. 
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Vulnerability A (shown in Figure 14) specifically looks for a Linux OS with an 
open port 80 (typically this indicates a web server).  Two exploits are available to use 
against this vulnerability:  A MiTM attack using Ettercap and a MoTS attack using Cain 
& Able.  These were chosen as examples, and any combination of integrated programs 
could have been employed.  As Cain & Able was not integrated into the system, the 
probability is initially set lower than that of the MiTM attack to ensure it was not 
selected.  To achieve the MiTM attack, another computer connecting to the webserver is 
required so the required field indicates the need for vulnerability B. 
Vulnerability B (not shown but included in Appendix B) requires that the 
computer have one of three open ports and be operating Windows XP.  In this case the 
three ports selected were known to be open on our target computer, but if a particular 
application was known to use a particular port, then this is where we could specifically 
target that application.  Alternately, for this vulnerability a denial of service attack is 
recommended, which would prevent that computer from timely access to the network.   
Together these two vulnerabilities allow a MiTM attack to be established between 
the client and the webserver. 
 
Figure 14.  Sample of the exploit XML. 
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2. Network Entity XML 
Figure 15 is one example of a network entity XML taken after only being 
processed by the Detect module.  Network entities in this case consider each unique IP 
address on the network; although, they are not limited by that and the address field 
indicates that this entity is based upon IP address.  A timestamp field is used to give a 
reference to when the scan was created so that multiple scans can be deconflicted and 
changes observed.  Because various discovery programs have different strengths and 
weaknesses, the program which was used is included in its own field.  Next, all 
information is gathered and parsed into its individual fields.  The field to which it is 
parsed should match the field being looked for in the exploit XML.  As discussed in 
Chapter II, the Open Ports and OSGuess are called features. 
 
Figure 15.  Example network entity XML. 
D. GUI 
An example screen shot of the GUI is provided in Figure 16 and is a basic 
indicator of what actions the system is performing.  It also provides buttons to indicate 
failure or success of the final attack in order to update the exploit XML document. 
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Figure 16.  Screenshot of GUI. 
E. DIPR MODULES 
The actions of each module and the end result of those actions are stepped 
through in this section.  The general tasks completed are outlined in Chapter II and are 
discussed in greater depth in the following sections. 
1. Detect Module 
The Detect module is where the discovery program is initially launched and its 
outputs parsed into the standardized format used by the subsequent modules.  The chosen 
discovery program was NMap, so the first thing the module performs is a system call to 
NMap using the command: 
nmap.exe –o 192.168.120.0/24 
This command is the command to scan all addresses in the network, determine 
open and closed ports, speculate an OS and record the MAC address of each active IP 
address on the network.  This is sent to a text file which is later parsed. 
The module then finds the desired features and parses the specific data from the 
text file.  This is built into the standardized network entity XML for that specific IP 
Address that those features belong to.  This is done for each IP Address that NMap was 
able to recognize on the network.  
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The network entity file of the target system after the Detect module has finished 
parsing the data is shown in Figure 17.  The 192.168.120.3 address corresponds to the 
Jaga webserver in our network, and both the MAC address and OS have been correctly 
determined. 
 
Figure 17.  Network entity XML after the Detect module. 
2. Identify Module 
The Identify module is where multiple features are combined to form a State.  To 
accomplish this transformation, the exploit XML is opened up and all the features that 
create a state are pulled and placed into a vector.  This matrix is then compared to the 
features of each IP address.  Should a match occur, an entry is appended to the network 
entity XML of “State 0” and with an indicator of which vulnerability exists. 
The same network entity after the Identify module is shown in Figure 18.  The 




Figure 18.  Network entity XML after the Identify module. 
3. Predict Module 
The Predict module is where the state is analyzed and the probabilities for which 
method of exploitation is recommended are determined.  The first step the module takes 
is to retrieve all recommendations for each type of vulnerability and calculate their 
decimal percentage.  For this proof-of-concept, probabilities are determined solely by 
previous successes divided by totals.  The initial values were chosen to force the 
prediction towards a MiTM attack with Ettercap, but the operator feedback at the end of 
the React module eventually skews these numbers either higher or lower.  Next, the 
module picks the attack with the highest probability and append this recommendation to 
the network entity XML. 
Future work for expanding and making this section more complete is discussed in 
Chapter IV.  The network entity file with the addition of recommendations for a MiTM 
attack using Ettercap is depicted in Figure 19.  The information that this attack requires 
an additional vulnerability B to be present for an attack is also included. 
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Figure 19.  Network entity XML after the Predict module. 
4. React Module 
The React module is where the inputs from the previous modules are used to 
launch an actual attack against the target network or computer.  This is done first by 
finding the recommendations of each network entity and determining which has the 
highest probability associated with their recommendation. The module then checks the 
recommendation to see if any further requirements exist.  If additional requirements exist, 
then it searches the other network entities to find the required vulnerability.  If none are 
found, then it moves to the network entity with the next highest probability of success 
associated with its recommendation.  If the additional requirement is found, then it 
provides all of the necessary information to the function which launches the 
recommended attack.  In this occurrence Ettercap was chosen and the command launched 
was: 
ettercap.exe –T –M arp:remote /192.168.120.10/ /192.168.120.3/ 
This command launches a MiTM attack (-M) using ARP Poisoning between the 
network’s webserver (192.168.120.10) and the target (192.168.120.3).  After the 
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command is launched, the network entity XML is updated with the timestamp and attack 
launched. Feedback for success can then be input by the operator, which then updates the 
exploit XML accordingly.  Determination of success or failure is further discussed in the 
next section.   
Figure 20 an illustration of the final network entity XML created which depicts 
that the updated information for the attack performed and timestamp has been added to 
the network entity XML.  
 
Figure 20.  Network entity XML after the React module. 
F. DETERMINING SUCCESS 
The MiTM attack using ARP poisoning is accomplished in a few steps that are 
possible to observe using a monitoring program such as Wireshark. The first step is the 
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ARP Poisoning itself.  This is observed by seeing ARP messages sent to the MAC 
addresses of the two target computers.  Because it is within a single network, only the 
MAC addresses need to be manipulated to intercept the data. The IP addresses of both 
targets remain unchanged through the attack.  As seen in Figure 21, the attack box 
(ending in 00:06) sends ARP messages to both of the victims (ending in 00:07 and 00:05) 
that the IP Address of the other victim belongs to the entity with the attack box MAC 
Address.  This is considered ARP Poisoning of the network because now both victims 
have this information stored in their ARP cache. 
 
Figure 21.  Wireshark capture of ARP poisoning the network via Ettercap. 
A representation of the before and after source/destination IP and MAC addresses 
of the victims is shown in Figure 22.  The attack box is now successfully intercepting any 
information passing between the two victims. 
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Figure 22.  MiTM attack in the network. 
Figure 23 is an illustration of the Wireshark output viewing the traffic between 
the two computers.  This is an example of viewing a simple webpage being accessed by 
the target.  If it was desired to watch similar traffic between the target and a webserver 
not on the network, the MiTM would be launched between the gateway router and the 
target.   
 
Figure 23.  Intercepted traffic viewed in Wireshark. 
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Should all of these indicators be observed, the operator would select “success” in 
the GUI; otherwise, “failure” would be selected.  Further discussion on automating 
verification is discussed in Chapter IV. 
G. CONCLUSIONS 
Final conclusions and results from the proof-of-concept are discussed in this 
section. 
1. Intelligence Automation Success and Flexibility 
The proof-of-concept itself accomplished the goals and tasks laid out in Chapter II 
while only implementing a very limited version of the system.  The groundwork was laid 
for scalability and expansion.  
2. Stealth 
By using only the freeware programs to access the network there is no indication 
to an observer on the network that the process was automated.  
3. Standardization and Scalability 
Standardization of freeware programs which are generated by a wide selection of 
individuals on the internet is impossible, but by using the Detect module as a translator 
program it is possible to integrate them. Ensuring the network entity XML fields and the 
exploit XML fields match is integral to this concept.  
4. Summary 
The proof-of-concept implementation of the DIPR automated intelligence model 
for cyber penetration testing was explained in this chapter.  The physical and virtual 
components as well as the required software were discussed as were the results of each 
module and how they interacted with the entire system.  Future work, improvements and 
final conclusions are discussed in Chapter IV. 
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IV. IMPROVEMENTS, FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSIONS 
Potential improvements for this specific proof-of-concept, future work which 
would create a more robust product and final conclusions on the success of the overall 
system are covered in this chapter. 
A. IMPROVEMENTS TO THE PROOF-OF-CONCEPT 
After the proof-of-concept was completed and tested, there were a few aspects 
that, if employed differently from the start, would have resulted in greater ease of 
implementation as well as a superior quality end product.  While the current proof-of-
concept meets the intended objectives, there are specific items that would make the 
process smoother. 
1. Operating Environment 
By coding in a Windows environment, the implementation of the freeware 
programs and meeting the program requirements of command line inputs and parseable 
outputs were difficult to meet.  In general, Windows is more user-friendly, GUI focused, 
and in most cases, freeware programs lacked command line inputs or a parseable output. 
Nmap and Ettercap were two of the few programs that met these needs.  By instead using 
a Linux environment for coding, the available number of suitable freeware programs 
would be much higher.  A breakdown of several freeware programs that were examined 
during implementation is shown in Table 2.  While these are by no means all of the 
available freeware programs, the breakdown was indicative of what is typically available.  
Many of the programs for Windows either lacked the command line input or the 













Windows     
NMap X X X  
Ettercap  (XP) X X X X 
Wireshark X    
tshark X X   
Tethereal (XP)  
*Command line version of Ethereal * X X X X 
tcpdump X    
NetStumbler (Wifi) X X X  
Cain & Able    X 
Nighthawk X  X X 
Linux     
NMap X X X  
Ettercap X X X X 
Wireshark X X   
Xprobe2 X X X  
Cain & Able X X X X 
tcpdump X X   
Ethereal X X X  
dsniff X X X X 
Kismet (Wifi) X X X  
EtherApe X X X  
Netcat X X X X 
2. Robustness 
Due to the limitations of the operating environment, only one of each type of 
program was implemented.  To fully realize the usefulness of standardization, multiple 
types of each program should be included.   
B. FUTURE WORK  
Future work to develop and expand upon the work successfully conducted in this 
thesis is discussed in this section.  Recommendations for building in an additional 
assessment module, statistically modeling the predict module and improving the user 
friendliness of the GUI are discussed. 
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1. Additional Assessment Module 
An additional module that could be added to the overall DIPR module is a 
standalone feedback module that would be able to tap into each of the four modules 
separately.  This would allow a measure of effectiveness for each particular stage and 
could help troubleshooting and streamlining the entire process.  This would allow for on-
the-fly learning and troubleshooting.  If any of the four modules are misconfigured or if 
the exploits themselves are incorrect, a standalone assessment module would be useful to 
find the issue and highlight where corrections need to be made.  The implementation of 
this is shown by Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24.  DIPR internal diagram with additional Assessment module. 
By setting the Assessment module outside of operational flows but with full 
access to each module, the additional module will provide automated oversight and 
trouble shooting. Particularly because of the need for standardization of the XML files 
fields, simple typos or lack of coding expertise during the detect portion for a new 
freeware implementation could result in the system either not working or in a duplication 
of effort.  Because of the nature of the automation, each module could cause the entire 
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system to break down, and the assessment module could help resolve exceptions or errors 
produced by the individual modules. This would reduce the time spent troubleshooting 
and provide a native metric of effectiveness for overall system health.  
Additionally, failures and exceptions created by the attack program could be fed 
into the Assessment module discussed in the previous future works section to provide 
real time feedback and see if additional information needs to either be cultivated from the 
discovery program or if the parameters stated in the exploit document need to be altered. 
2. Predict Module 
The Predict module provides the recommendation for type and implementation of 
cyber penetration attack launched by the React module. By developing and implementing 
a statistical model for which penetration attacks are the most likely to succeed based on 
network configuration, the Predict module can become the keystone of the system. As 
implemented (and as discussed in the previous subsection) in the proof-of-concept, the 
Predict module is simply a less-than or greater-than comparison between success ratios.  
This method is weak because only one implementation of cyber penetration attack will 
ever be generated, and it does not provide the opportunity for other implementations to 
improve their ratio.  Nor does it provide any feedback for how or why those other 
implementations failed. Future work might include developing a model to see which 
implementations work the best and what network characteristics give them the greatest 
chance of success. This can then be used to populate the exploit XML with more detailed 
and precise network/host requirements.   
3. GUI 
A robust GUI aids the operator in launching the desired attack against the 
network.  Automation should be limited only to the implementation of what the operator 
desires; otherwise, the consequences of starting the system cannot be determined 
beforehand.  Creating a GUI that informs the operator of options along the way can also 
be useful in the event that the system is placed onto the network with no prior knowledge 
of components.  Striking the balance between providing flexibility and options while not 
overwhelming the operator with information is a delicate task that can be eased by a user-
friendly advanced GUI. 
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4. Intelligent Automation of New Freeware 
A valuable tool to reduce the amount of manual work for the operator would be 
automating the addition of new programs with a separate system.  By being able to parse 
or determine the various options (either by trial and error or by options via the 
instructional page) and creating rules to determine which programs function together, 
new freeware can easily be imported into the system.  However, this relies on accurate 
and robust documentation of all options for the freeware program, a factor that is unlikely 
to occur in all cases.  Therefore, it does not eliminate the operator or the need for some 
manual coding but would save vast amounts of time and effort if implemented properly. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
Overall conclusions of both the DIPR system as a whole as well as the proof-of-
concept specifically are presented in this section. 
1. DIPR System 
Overall, the Automated DIPR Penetration Testing System showed a unique and 
scalable method for automation of penetration testing by integrating freeware programs 
into a unified whole.  By utilizing the DIPR intelligence automation model as a backbone 
architecture, integration was possible and showed a versatile adaptation which could be 
used to assimilate many other programs.  Using individual XML documents for each 
entity on a network and an additional XML document to specify desired vulnerabilities, 
we were able to show that outputs of one program could be used to feed into the input of 
a disparate program.  By processing and manipulating the outputs of the discovery 
programs, we can mesh them into a more advanced structure than is possible from any 
single program. 
2. Proof-of-concept 
The proof-of-concept successfully implemented a barebones implementation of 
the Automated Penetration Testing DIPR architecture.  Using NMap and Ettercap as the 
freeware programs, we were able to show that the output of one program, processed and 
standardized, could be the input to another program.  The processing and standardization 
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between these steps is where the artificial intelligence played a role.  The processing was 
done by a series of modules set to detect individual features of network entities and to 
then process and mesh those features into individual states.  These states could be 








#Purpose: Step through each module, allow input from user 
#to update the exploit xml, display steps 
#Main FCN: WalkThroughSequence 
#*********************************************# 
import Tkinter as tk 







#Sets up the GUI# 
top = Tk() 
top.title("DIPR Automated Cyber Penetration System") 
top.geometry("200x250")#sets size and geometry 
 
#*********************************************# 
#Function:  WalkThroughSequence 
#Purpose: Walks through each module, Builds the GUI 
#Input: None 
#Output: v - Success or failure of the entire walk through 
#*********************************************# 
def WalkThroughSequence(): 
   text = Text(top, width = 25, height = 9, wrap = WORD) 
   text.insert(INSERT, 'Starting... \n') 
   text.grid(row = 1,column = 0) 
   y = Detect.Discover("NMap")#runs detect module 
   if y == 'Success': 
      text.insert(END, 'Dectect Successful \n') 
      z = Identify.IdStates()#runs identify module 
      if z == 'Success': 
         text.insert(END, 'Identify Successful \n') 
         w = Predict.Predict() #runs predict module 
         if w == 'Success': 
            text.insert(END, 'Predict Successful \n') 
            (v, vul, atk) = React.React() #runs React Module 
            if v == 'Success': 
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               text.insert(END, 'React Successful.\n Please view Wireshark \n') 
               #adds in the buttons for success or failure 
               #runs the success or failure function located in React 
               C = Button(top, text = 'Success?', command = lambda: 
React.UpdateSuccess(vul, atk)) 
               D = Button(top, text = 'Failure?', command = lambda: React.UpdateFailure(vul, 
atk)) 
               C.grid(row = 2, column = 0) 
               D.grid(row = 3, column = 0) 
   return v 
 
B = Button(top, text ="Start Sequence", command = WalkThroughSequence) 
B.grid(row = 0,column = 0)#puts the button into our window 
 






#Purpose: Detect network entities and 
#create XML files with features of Entity 





import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET 
 
#************************# 
#Function:  Discover 
#Purpose: Discover network entities parse information 
#store parsed information in an XML file 
#Input: Program - Name of program desired to be used to discover the network entities 





   #Calls the NMap Program and pipes the result into a file called infosearch.txt 
   #-O means look for possible Operating systems. To do this it will scan for open ports as 
well 
   #if Program == "Nmap": 
      #os.system('"C:\\Program Files\\Nmap\\nmap.exe" -O 192.168.120.0/24 > 
infosearch.txt') 
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   info = []; 
   y = -1; 
   timestamp = ' ' 
   filen = '' 
   #Index will eventually be the master index XML file that will keep track of who is in 
the network 
   Index = ET.Element('Index') 
   #IP will eventually become the network entity XML 
   IP = ET.Element('Address') 
 
   #Begin to parse the infosearch file with the piped information from NMap 
   for line in open('infosearch.txt', 'r'): #Walk through each line of the file 
      if 'Starting' in line: #pulling the timestamp for each scan 
         k = line.split(' at ') 
         timestamp = k[1] #timestamp at which NMap was run      
      if 'scan report' in line:#We've run into a new IP address make a new port list 
         if y > -1: 
            tree = ET.ElementTree(IP) 
            tree.write(filen, "us-ascii", xml_declaration = None, default_namespace = None, 
method = 'xml') 
            IP = IP.clear() 
            IP = ET.Element('Address') 
         k = line.split(' ') 
         p = k[4].strip() #calling the strip fcn pulls white space of either side of the string 
         filen = 'IP' + p + '.xml' #creates a filename based off of IP address 
         IP.text = k[4].strip() 
         ind = ET.SubElement(Index, 'IP') #creates our top node IP 
         ind.text = k[4].strip() 
         time = ET.SubElement(IP, 'TimeStamp') #Fills in details 
         time.text = timestamp.strip() 
         prog = ET.SubElement(IP, 'ProgramUsed') #What program is being used 
         prog.text = 'Nmap 6.25'     
         y = y+1 
      if 'MAC Address:' in line:#Looks at what the MAC address is for that IP 
         k = line.split(' ') 
         ma = ET.SubElement(IP, 'MacAddress') 
         ma.text = k[2].strip() 
      if 'open' in line: #Looks at what ports are Open 
         k =  line.split('/') 
         op = ET.SubElement(IP, 'OpenPort') 
         op.text = k[0].strip() 
      if 'Running' in line: #Looks at what OS NMap thinks its running 
         k = line.split(':') 
         k = k[1].split(',') 
         for item in k: 
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            if 'or ' in item and item.index('or ') < 4: 
               h = item.split('or ') 
               OSGuess = ET.SubElement(IP, 'OSGuess') 
               OSGuess.text = h[1].strip() 
            else:  
                 OSGuess = ET.SubElement(IP, 'OSGuess') 
                 OSGuess.text = item.strip() 
 
   #Prints our master index list and the XML list to their respective files 
   tree = ET.ElementTree(IP) 
   tree.write(filen, "us-ascii", xml_declaration = None, default_namespace = None, 
method = 'xml') 
   tree = ET.ElementTree(Index) 
   tree.write('IPAddressIndex.xml', encoding = 'us-ascii') 







#Purpose: Go through each Network Entity and 
#determine if a state exists 
#Main FCN: IdStates() 
#*********************************************# 
 
import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET 
from datetime import datetime 
 
#*********************************************# 
#Function:  IsEqual 
#Purpose: Compares an exploit list against a single IP 
#address to determine if a state exists 
#Input: a - exploit vector that looks like: 
#['A', ['OSGuess', 'Linux 2.6.X'], ['OpenPort', '80']] 
#["Name of Vulnerability", [Vector of Aspect followed by specifics], etc..] 
# b - pointer to the XML of a single IP address 
#Output: matching- vector containing the name of vulnerability 
# and if each thing checked were true or false. Will look like: 
#['A', False, False] 
#*********************************************# 
def IsEqual(a , b): 
    matching = [] 
    matching.append(a[0]) 
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    #check for matching ports 
    ports = b.findall('OpenPort') 
    check = [] 
    for p in ports: 
        u = p.text 
        check.append(u) 
    counter = 0 
    ans = False 
    for y in a: 
        if counter > 0: 
            if y[0] == 'OpenPort': 
                for i in y: 
                    for u in check: 
                        if i == u: 
                            ans = True          
        counter = counter +1 
    matching.append(ans) 
 
    #check for matching OSs 
    osg = b.findall('OSGuess') 
    check = [] 
    for os in osg: 
        u = os.text 
        check.append(u) 
    counter = 0 
    ans = False 
    for y in a: 
        if counter > 0: 
            if y[0] == 'OSGuess': 
                for i in y: 
                    for u in check: 
                        if i in u: 
                            ans = True 
        counter = counter +1 
    matching.append(ans) 
    return matching 
 
#*********************************************# 
#Function:  GetExploits 
#Purpose: pulls the entire exploit xml and makes 
#it a vector we can use to compare to the IP address 
#Input: None 
#Output: exploitlist vector contains a list of exploits and vectors for 
#for the various aspects.  Looks like: 
#[['A', ['OSGuess', 'Linux 2.6.X'], ['OpenPort', '80']], 
 61 
# ['B', ['OSGuess', 'Microsoft Windows 2000|XP', 'Windows XP SP2'], ['OpenPort', 
'3389', '6667', '7000']]] 
#*********************************************# 
def GetExploits(): 
    tree = ET.parse('Exploits.xml') 
    root = tree.getroot() 
    exploitlist = [] 
    l=0 
    for Vul in root.iter('Vulnerability'):   
        y = []  
        exploitlist.append([Vul.text]) 
        for Asp in Vul.iter('Aspect'): 
            y.append(Asp.text) 
            for Sp in Asp.iter('Spec'): 
                y.append(Sp.text) 
            exploitlist[l].append(y)        
            y =[] 
        l = l+1; 
    return exploitlist 
 
#*********************************************# 
#Function:  GetIPAddresses 
#Purpose: pulls all IP addresses from the master list and returns a vector with them 
#Input: None 
#Output: vector list of IP addresses 
#Looks like: ['192.168.120.3', '192.168.120.4', '192.168.120.10', '192.168.120.150'] 
#*********************************************# 
def GetIPAddresses(): 
    tree = ET.parse('IPAddressIndex.xml') 
    root = tree.getroot() 
    IPAddList = [] 
    for IP in root.iter('IP'): 
        IPAddList.append(IP.text) 
    return IPAddList 
 
#*********************************************# 
#Function:  IdStates 
#Purpose: uses other functions to create queries, test if they are true 
#and then updates the network entity xml to reflect that a state exisits or not 
#Input: None 
#Output: "Success" to let the GUI know that Identify completed correctly 
#*********************************************# 
def IdStates(): 
    elist = GetExploits() 
    ilist = GetIPAddresses() 
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    for add in ilist: 
        filen = 'IP' + add + '.xml' 
        tree = ET.parse(filen) 
        root = tree.getroot() 
        t = datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %I:%M%p") 
        for ex in elist: 
            ans = IsEqual(ex, root) 
            if all(ans): 
                state = ET.SubElement(root, 'State') 
                state.text = 'State 0' 
                Vul = ET.SubElement(state, 'Vulnerability') 
                Vul.text = ans[0] 
                Time = ET.SubElement(state, 'TimeStamp') 
                Time.text = t + " Pacific Daylight Time" 
        tree.write(filen, 'us-ascii') 








#Purpose: Go through each Network Entity, find if a state 
#exists, make a recommendation for an attack for that state 
#provide expected probability of success 
#Main FCN: Predict() 
#*********************************************# 
 
import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET 
from datetime import datetime 
 
#*********************************************# 
#Function:  GetRecommendations() 
#Purpose: Opens exploits.xml, calculates recommended exploits 
#and percentages 
#Input: None 
#Output: list of exploits and probabilities. Looks like: 
#[['A', ['MiTM-Ettercap', 0.625, 'B'], ['MoTS-Cain and Able', 0.428]]] 
#*********************************************# 
def GetRecommendations(): 
    tree = ET.parse('Exploits.xml') 
    root = tree.getroot() 
    exploitlist = [] 
    l=0 
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    for Vul in root.iter('Vulnerability'):   
        y = []  
        exploitlist.append([Vul.text]) 
        for Rec in Vul.iter('Recommend'): 
            y.append(Rec.text) 
            for Pr in Rec.iter('Prob'): 
                v = Pr.text 
                v = v.split(':') 
                n = float(v[0])/float(v[1]) 
                y.append(n) 
            for Rq in Rec.iter('Requires'): 
                y.append(Rq.text) 
            exploitlist[l].append(y)        
            y =[] 
        l = l+1; 
    return exploitlist 
 
#*********************************************# 
#Function:  GetIPAddresses 
#Purpose: pulls all IP addresses from the master list and returns a vector with them 
#Input: None 
#Output: vector list of IP addresses 
#Looks like: ['192.168.120.3', '192.168.120.4', '192.168.120.10', '192.168.120.150'] 
#*********************************************# 
def GetIPAddresses(): 
    tree = ET.parse('IPAddressIndex.xml') 
    root = tree.getroot() 
    IPAddList = [] 
    for IP in root.iter('IP'): 
        IPAddList.append(IP.text) 
    return IPAddList 
 
#*********************************************# 
#Function:  MakeRec 
#Purpose: given a vector of found vulnerabilities choose the 
#one with the highest prob and return it 
#Input: r. List of exploits. 
#Looks like: [['A', ['MiTM-Ettercap', 0.625, 'B'], ['MoTS-Cain and Able', 0.428]]] 
#General form is Name of Vulnerability, [Name of attack, probability, additional 
requirements], etc 
#Output: Exploit with recommended attack and probability and any other requirements 
#Looks like: ['MiTM-Ettercap', 0.625, 'B'] 




    y = [' ', 0] 
    counter = 0 
    for a in r: 
        if counter > 0: 
            if a[1] > y[1]: 
                y = a 
        counter = counter +1 
    return y 
 
#*********************************************# 
#Function:  Predict 
#Purpose: Go through network entities, see if a state 0 exists, if it does find 
#the recommended exploit, update the entity xml to reflect this 
#Input: None 
#Output: Success to indicate the module has run correctly 
#*********************************************# 
def Predict(): 
    rlist = GetRecommendations() 
    ilist = GetIPAddresses() 
    t = datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %I:%M%p") 
    for add in ilist: 
        filen = 'IP' + add + '.xml' 
        tree = ET.parse(filen) 
        root = tree.getroot() 
        for st in root.iter("State"): 
            if st.text == "State 0": 
                for vul in st.iter('Vulnerability'): 
                    for r in rlist: 
                        if r[0] == vul.text: 
                            z = MakeRec(r) 
                            RElem = ET.SubElement(root, 'Recommend') 
                            RElem.text = z[0] 
                            TElem = ET.SubElement(RElem,'Timestamp') 
                            TElem.text = t 
                            PElem = ET.SubElement(RElem, 'Prob') 
                            PElem.text = str(z[1]) 
                            if len(z) > 2: 
                                QElem = ET.SubElement(RElem, 'Requires') 
                                QElem.text = z[2] 
        tree.write(filen, 'us-ascii') 










#Purpose: Take recommendations from the network entities 
#verify required conditions exist.  Launch attack. Update 
#success or failutre based on user input 
#Main FCN: React() 
#*********************************************# 
import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET 
import subprocess 
from datetime import datetime 
 
#*********************************************# 
#Function:  GetVulnerabilities 
#Purpose: Finds vulnerabilities in each XML file and 
#returns them to the calling function along with their 
#probability and any requirements 
#Input: None 
#Output: (vlist, prob)  vlist is a matrix containing 
#vectors of IP addresses with recommended attacks, the attack 
#and further requirements for the attack 
#vlist looks like: [['A', '192.168.120.3', 'MiTM-Ettercap', 'B'], 
#['192.168.120.10', 'DOS-Cain and Able'], 
#prob is a vector of probabilities of each of the vlist addresses 
#prob looks like: ['0.625', '0.6', '0.625'] 
#*********************************************# 
def GetVulnerabilities(): 
    ilist = GetIPAddresses() 
    vlist = [] 
    prob = [] 
    for i in ilist: 
        filen = 'IP'+ i + '.xml' 
        tree = ET.parse(filen) 
        root = tree.getroot() 
        hold = [] 
        for v in root.iter("State"): 
            for s in v.iter("Vulnerability"): 
                hold.append(s.text) 
        for rc in root.iter("Recommend"): 
             
            hold.append(root.text) 
            hold.append(rc.text) 
            for pr in rc.iter("Prob"): 
                prob.append(pr.text) 
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            for rq in rc.iter("Requires"): 
                hold.append(rq.text) 
            vlist.append(hold) 
    return (vlist, prob) 
 
#*********************************************# 
#Function:  FindVul 
#Purpose: Finds a specific vulnerability from all of the IP 
#addresses. Used to see if additional requirements are met 
#Input: fv - name of the vulnerabilty to be found i.e., 'B' 




    ilist = GetIPAddresses() 
    IP = 'No IP Found' 
    for i in ilist: 
        filen = 'IP' + i + '.xml' 
        tree = ET.parse(filen) 
        root = tree.getroot() 
        for vul in root.iter('Vulnerability'): 
            if vul.text == fv: 
                IP = root.text 
    return IP 
 
#*********************************************# 
#Function:  runEttercap 
#Purpose: Runs the ettercap program from the command line 
#Input: victim1 and victim2- IP addresses of the two entities we'd like to 
#perform a MiTM attack on  
#Output: True - denotes attack called 
#*********************************************# 
def runEttercap(victim1, victim2): 
    #command = ["C:\\Program Files\\Ettercap Development Team\\Ettercap-
0.7.4\\ettercap.exe", '-T', '-M', 'arp:remote', '/'+ victim1+ '/', '/'+ victim2 + '/'] 
    #subprocess.call(command) 
    update(victim1, True, 'MiTM-Ettercap') 
    return True 
 
#*********************************************# 
#Function:  update 
#Purpose: Updates the entity xml with the time date and success 
#(or failure) of the attack 
#Input: IP - network entity IP address, Success- success or failure 
#Attack - what attack was performed 
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#Output: True - denotes update complete 
#*********************************************# 
def update(IP, Success, Attack): 
    filen = 'IP' + IP + '.xml' 
    tree = ET.parse(filen) 
    root = tree.getroot() 
    t = datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %I:%M%p") 
    if Success == True: 
        AElem = ET.SubElement(root, 'AttackPerformed') 
        AElem.text = Attack 
        TElem = ET.SubElement(AElem, 'TimeStamp') 
        TElem.text = t 
    tree.write(filen, 'us-ascii') 
    return True 
 
#*********************************************# 
#Function:  GetIPAddresses 
#Purpose: pulls all IP addresses from the master list and returns a vector with them 
#Input: None 
#Output: vector list of IP addresses 
#Looks like: ['192.168.120.3', '192.168.120.4', '192.168.120.10', '192.168.120.150'] 
#*********************************************# 
def GetIPAddresses(): 
    tree = ET.parse('IPAddressIndex.xml') 
    root = tree.getroot() 
    IPAddList = [] 
    for IP in root.iter('IP'): 
        IPAddList.append(IP.text) 
    return IPAddList 
 
#*********************************************# 
#Function:  React 
#Purpose: gets list of possible attacks, probabilities and requirements 
#finds highest probability, if requirements are met it launches that attack 
#if they are not it goes to the next highest probabilty and continues to check 
#until it can launch. Then it updates. 
#Input: None 
#Output: Success- tells GUI that react module completed 
#*********************************************# 
def React(): 
    (vlist, prob) = GetVulnerabilities() 
    p = prob.index(max(prob)) 
    attack = vlist[p] 
    if len(attack) > 3: 
        v2 = FindVul(attack[3]) 
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    if attack[2] == 'MiTM-Ettercap': 
        runEttercap(attack[1], v2)         
    if attack[2] == 'DOS-Cain and Able': 
        print 'No current attack...sorry' 
    return ('Success', attack[0], attack[2]) 
 
#*********************************************# 
#Function:  UpdateSuccess 
#Purpose: Updates Exploit XML probability for that attack with 
#success. 
#Input: Vul - vulnerability exploited 
#Attack - attack launched for that vulnerability 
#Output: 'Updated' to indicate that update has completed 
#*********************************************# 
def UpdateSuccess(Vul, Attack): 
    tree = ET.parse("Exploits.xml") 
    root = tree.getroot() 
    for V in root.iter("Vulnerability"): 
        if V.text == Vul: 
            for A in V.iter("Recommend"): 
                if A.text == Attack: 
                    for P in A.iter("Prob"): 
                        k = P.text.split(":") 
                        k[0] = int(k[0])+1 
                        k[1] = int(k[1])+1 
                        m = str(k[0])+ ":" + str(k[1]) 
                        P.text = m 
    tree.write("Exploits.xml", 'us-ascii') 
    return 'Updated' 
 
#*********************************************# 
#Function:  UpdateFailure 
#Purpose: Updates Exploit XML probability for that attack with 
#failure. 
#Input: Vul - vulnerability exploited 
#Attack - attack launched for that vulnerability 
#Output: 'Updated' to indicate that update has completed 
#*********************************************# 
def UpdateFailure(Vul, Attack): 
    tree = ET.parse("Exploits.xml") 
    root = tree.getroot() 
    for V in root.iter("Vulnerability"): 
        if V.text == Vul: 
            for A in V.iter("Recommend"): 
                if A.text == Attack: 
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                    for P in A.iter("Prob"): 
                        k = P.text.split(":") 
                        k[1] = int(k[1])+1 
                        m = k[0]+ ":" + str(k[1]) 
                        P.text = m 
    tree.write("Exploits.xml", 'us-ascii')    










  <Aspect>OSGuess 
   <Spec>Linux 2.6.X</Spec> 
  </Aspect> 
  <Aspect>OpenPort 
   <Spec>80</Spec> 
  </Aspect> 
  <Recommend>MiTM-Ettercap 
   <Prob>5:8</Prob> 
   <Requires>B</Requires> 
  </Recommend> 
  <Recommend>MoTS-Cain and Able 
   <Prob>3:7</Prob> 
  </Recommend> 
 </Vulnerability> 
 <Vulnerability>B 
  <Aspect>OSGuess 
   <Spec>Microsoft Windows 2000|XP</Spec> 
   <Spec>Windows XP SP2</Spec> 
  </Aspect> 
  <Aspect>OpenPort 
   <Spec>3389</Spec> 
   <Spec>6667</Spec> 
   <Spec>7000</Spec> 
  </Aspect> 
  <Recommend>MiTM-Ettercap 
   <Prob>5:10</Prob> 
  </Recommend> 
  <Recommend>DOS-Cain and Able 
   <Prob>6:10</Prob> 
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